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ANOTHER LOOK AT PICKETING IN WASHINGTON
DONALD H. WOLLE=T*

DISCREPANCIES creep into our decisions from time to time, and it is
frequently necessary that a review be had of our opinions, at which time
the cases may be analyzed, approved, or overruled, to the end that the law
be made certain, so that individuals and organizations, and members of the
bench and bar, may be advised of the holdings of this court. In cases like
the one at bar, organized, nonorganized labor, and employers are entitled
to definite decisions regarding their rights and liabilities, to the end that
they may conduct their affairs as law-abiding citizens, without danger to
themselves or their property.-Judge Simpson, speaking for the majority,
in Gazzam v. Building Service Employees' International Union, Local 262,
29 Wn. (2d) 488, 492, 188 P. (2d) 97, 99 (1947).

T

PURPOSE of this comment is threefold: (1) to reformulate the
Washington rules in re peaceful picketing in light of Ostroff v.
Laundry and Dye Works Drivers' Local No. 566;1 (2) to suggest,
using the metaphor employed by Judge Hamley in his dissenting
opinion, that the rule of the Ostroff case embarks the court on a voyage
into uncharted seas; and (3) to suggest further the wisdom of the
court's returning to port and recharting a course over better marked
and more frequently traveled waters.
HE

ANTECEDENTS OF THE OSTROFF CASE

The legal history of peaceful picketing in the state of Washington
has two principal characteristics: (1) the multiplicity of theories
applied by the Washington Supreme Court to judge its legality; (2)
the ease and frequency with which the court has shifted from one
theory to another.
In 1905 the court, apparently applying the then rather widely held
doctrine that peaceful picketing is a contradiction in terms, adopted
the rule that all picketing is an unjustifiable interference with advantageous relationships between employers, employees, and consumersipso facto "coercive" and unlawful.2 Seventeen years later this rule
was apparently abandoned, partly as a result of the decision of the
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Washington.
1 137 Wash. Dec. 559, 225 P. (2d) 419 (1950) ; rehearing denied, 138 Wash. Dec.
183 2(1951).
Jensen v. Cooks' & Waiters' Union, 39 Wash. 531, 81 Pac. 1069 (1905). Accord:
St. Germain v. Bakery & Confectionary Workers' Union No. 9, 97 Wash. 282, 166 Pac.

665 (1917).
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United States Supreme Court in American Steel Foundriesv. Tri-City
Trades Council,' in favor of the theory that the "persuasive" (lawful)
and "coercive" (unlawful) aspects of picketing should be separated.'
The rule of thumb that picketing within 100 feet is coercive and without 100 feet is persuasive was a specific implementation of this theory.'
In 1925 the court, persuaded that the Washington legislature of 1919
had endorsed the earlier doctrine by passing a version of Sections 6
and 20 of the Clayton Act which failed to extend any protection to
picketing,6 apparently reverted to the rule that all picketing is unlawful.! But five years later the court attempted to reconcile the two
rules by a semantic device. Relying in part on Duane's Military Dictionary, which defines a picket as "an out-guard posted before an army
to give notice of an enemy approaching," the court held that patrolling
with a banner outside 100 feet is not picketing.'
In 1933 the Washington legislature passed an anti-injunction statute
drawn almost verbatim from the Norris-LaGuardia Act' and known
as the Labor Disputes Act.' This statute was intended to prohibit
the issuance of injunctions against the use by trade unions of their
traditional economic pressure weapons, including picketing, provided
that a labor dispute existed (as defined in the act) and fraud or violence
did not. It made an immediate impact. Presented with its first picketing
case arising under the statute, the court held that "stranger" picketing (picketing by a union which has no members employed by the
picketed employer) does not arise out of a labor dispute and enjoined
it on the ground that its objective was unlawful-viz., to force the
employer to "ask, urge, or coerce, directly or indirectly, its employees,
who are at liberty to do as they please, to join ... [the] organization."
Safeway Stores v. Retail Clerks Union, Local No. 148." The Safeway
case, dealing solely with "stranger" picketing, left open the question
of the legality of picketing which arose out of a labor dispute.
The court apparently answered this question one year later in
3 257 U.S. 184 (1921).

4 Pacific Coast Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 122 Wash. 423, 210 Pac. 953
(1922).
5 Adams v. Cooks & Waiters, 124 Wash. 564, 215 Pac. 19 (1923).
6REM. REv. STAT. § 7611, 12, 13, 14 [P. P. C. § 700-1 et seq.].
7 Danz v. Musicians, 133 Wash. 186, 233 Pac. 630 (1925).
S Sterling Theaters v. Central Labor Council, 155 Wash. 217, 223, 283 Pac. 1081,
1083 (1930) ; Carey, Status of the Right to Picket in Washington, 5 WASH. L. REV.
126 (1930).
947 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. § 101 et seq. (1946).
10 REm. REv. STAT. § 7612-1 et seq. [P. P. C. § 695-1 et seq.].
1184 Wash. 322, 338, 51 P.(2d) 372, 379 (1935).
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Blanchard v. Golden Age Brewery. Confronted with striking and
boycotting arising out of a labor dispute because, inter alia, it was
"proximate -- that is, the union had members employed by the employers, the court invalidated Sections 7, 8, and 9 of the Labor Disputes Act and held that there was no error in the trial court's issuance
of an injunction prohibiting the conduct because its objective-similar
to that proscribed in the Safeway case-was improper. 2 A reasonable
inference from this decision would have been that all union self-help,
including picketing, was to be judged on the basis of the propriety of
its objective, irrespective of whether or not it arose out of a labor
dispute as defined in a substantially discarded statute. However, such
an inference, while reasonable, would have been far from accurate.
The 'labor dispute" test not only survived the Blanchard case. but it
also prospered.
During the next five years the court, basing its decisions on the
"stranger" character of the picketing and the impropriety of its objective, enjoined "non-labor dispute" picketing in every case in which
the issue was presented. 3 These decisions alone created no inconsistency with the Blanchard doctrine. However, during the same
period the court refused to enjoin "labor dispute" picketing, 4 thus
supporting the hypothesis that the basic test of legality was the absence
or presence of a labor dispute rather than the propriety of objective.
For example, the decision in Kimbel v. Lumber & Sawmill Workers
Union No. 2575 permitted "proximate" picketing intended to force
employees to join the union and the employer to recognize it-the
same objective which the court had thought improper in the Safeway
case. 3 The result was clouded, however, by the fact that the picketing
was also intended to obtain higher wages, an objective which the court
later described as "reasonable." Moreover, the court did not rely on the
Labor Disputes Act.
12 188 Wash. 386, 63 P.(2d) 97 (1936) (Statutory sections invalidated on the theory
that legislation abridging the power of the courts to issue injunctions violates the state
constitution,
which vests all judicial power in the courts).
' 3 Adams v. Building Service Employees' International Union, Local No. 6, 197
Wash. 242, 84 P. (2d) 1021 (1938) ; Fornili v. Auto Mechanics' Local Union No. 297,
200 Wash. 283, 93 P.(2d) 422 (1939); Shively v. Garage Employees' Local Union
No. 44, 6 Wn.(2d) 560, 108 P.(2d) 354 (1940); Bloedel-Donovan Lumber Mills v.
International Woodworkers of America, Local No. 46, 4 Wn. (2d) 62, 102 P. (2d)
270 (1940).
'1'Edwards v. Teamsters' Local Union No. 313, 8 Wn.(2d) 492, 113 P.(2d) 28
(1941) ; Marvel Baking Co. v. Teamsters' Union Local No. 524, 5 Wn. (2d) 346, 105
P. (2d) 46 (1940) (Distinguishable because the employer had violated his contract with
the union); Kimbel v. Lumber & Sawmill Workers' Union No. 2575, 189 Wash. 416,
65 P.(2d) 1066 (1937).
'5189 Wash. 416, 65 P.(2d) 1066 (1937).
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The picture became badly confused in the early 1940's during the
heyday of the doctrine that peaceful picketing is a species of free
speech entitled to the protection of the First and Fourteenth Amendments." Basing its decision on that doctrine, the court abandoned the
"labor dispute" test in O'Neil v. Building Service Employees' International Union Local No. 6 and held that "stranger" picketing for
organizational purposes was nonenjoinable, even though the picketed
"employer" was a businessman-worker with no "employees."' 7 The
rule was affirmed in S&W Fine Foods, Inc. v. Retail Delivery Drivers'
and Salesmen's Union, Local No. 6, where there were "employees.""
Further, the court, applying the same theory, in State ex rel. Lumber
& Sawmill Workers v. Superior Court9 refused to enjoin "stranger"
picketing, despite the fact that the employer was obligated under the
National Labor Relations Act"0 to bargain with another union, because
the picketing was intended only to induce the employee-members of
the certified union to join the picketing union in a multi-employer
strike for higher wages.
The free speech doctrine was short-lived. In 1942 the United States
Supreme Court had, by a vote of 5 to 4, upheld the power of Texas
to restrain "stranger" picketing outside the area of the industry within
which the dispute arose when it conscripted neutrals who had no relationship either to the dispute or the industry. Carpenters' & Joiners'
Union of America v. Ritter's Cafe."' Early in 1947 the Washington
court was presented with the case of Swenson v. Seattle Central Labor
Council which involved "stranger" picketing intended to force an
employer to bargain with the picketing union when he was obligated
under the NLRA to bargain with another union. The Ritter's Cafe case
was not strictly in point, but it had eroded the free speech doctrine,
and it gave the court a basis for restraining the picketing on the
grounds that its objective was improper and that it did not arise out
of a labor dispute.2 2
16 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) ; A. F. of L. v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321
(1941) ; Baker & Pastry Drivers' and Helpers' Local 802 v. Eohl, 315 U.S. 769 (1942);
Cafeteria Employees' Union, Local 302 v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293 (1943).
1-7 9 Wn.(2d) 507, 115 P.(2d) 662 (1941).
2s 11 Wn.(2d) 262, 118 P.(2d) 962 (1941).
19 24 Wn.(2d) 314, 164 P.(2d) 662 (1945).
20 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U. S. C. § 141 et seq. (Supp. 1950).
21315 U.S. 722 (1942).
22 27 Wn. (2d) 193, 177 P. (2d) 873 (1947). Previously, in Bloedel-Donovan Mills
v. International Woodworkers of Anerica, Local No. 46, 4 Wn. (2d) 62, 102 P. (2d)
270 (1940), the court had enjoined picketing when the employer had the duty under the
National Labor Relations Act to bargain with a union certified by the National Labor
Relations Board as the exclusive bargaining representative and the picketing was
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Since the court's decision six years before in Weyerhaeuser Timber
Co. v. Everett District Council of Lumber & Sawmill Workers had
permitted "proximate" picketing (12 employees out of 1,277 belonged
to the defendant union) on the theory that it arose out of a labor
dispute, even though compliance by the employer with the picketing
union's demands would have violated the NLRA," the Swenson case
added some support to the theory that the basic test of legality was
the absence or presence of a labor dispute rather than the propriety
of the objective.
The extent to which the free speech doctrine had been abandoned
and the "labor dispute" test re-established became clear later in the
same year when the court squarely overruled the S & W Fine Foods
and O'Neil cases, supra, and held that "stranger" picketing does not
arise out of a labor dispute and is unlawful when one of its objectives
is to force the employer to sign a union shop agreement. Gazzam v.
Building Service Employees' International Union, Local 262.24
From the Gazzam case to December, 1950, the court uniformly
adhered to the "labor dispute" test. In Hanke v. InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters" and Cline v. Automobile Drivers' and Demonstrators' Local Union No. 8828 "stranger" picketing was enjoined
because it did not arise out of a labor dispute and was intended to
compel businessmen-workers to agree to a contract regulating their
hours of business. But in Wright v. Teamsters' Union Local No. 690
the court held that "proximate" picketing arose out of a labor dispute
and was lawful even though one of its objectives was to regulate the
employer's hours of business."7 In Berger v. Sailors Union of the
Pacific the court held that "proximate" picketing arose out of a labor
dispute and was lawful even though intended to force the employer to
assist in the organization of his employees by, among other things,
intended to abrogate a valid closed shop contract between the employer and the certified
union. The court referred to the Labor Disputes Act and found no labor dispute on the
theory that the picketing unionists could not be recognized as employees of the employer
since they belonged to the "out" union and had not been employed at the time the
picketing began. Since the court apparently treated the picketing union as a "stranger,"
the case is on all fours with Swenson v. Seattle Labor Council, . upra, except for the
fact that a formal collective bargaining agreement had been negotiated.
2311 Wn.(2d) 503, 119 P.(2d) 643 (1941). The court, while permitting peaceful
picketing, limited the number of pickets and restrained molesting and obstructing.
Three of the judges, concurring in two opinions, based their concurrence on the free
speech doctrine. See Purdue, State Courts PonderFree Speech, 17 WASH. L. REv. 155,
164-168 (1942).
2429 Wn.(2d) 488, 188 P.(2d) 97 (1947), aff'd., 339 U.S. 532 (1950).
2533 Wn. (2d) 646, 207 P. (2d) 206 (1949), aff'd., 339 U.S. 470 (1950).
2033 Wn.(2d) 666, 207 P.(2d) 216 (1949), aff'd., 339 U.S. 470 (1950).
27 33 Wn. (2d) 905, 207 P. (2d) 662 (1949).
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signing a union security agreement-the objective which the court
had held improper in the Gazzam case where the picketing was
"stranger."'" This decision, clearly contrary to the Blanchard doctrine,
provoked judicial protest. 9
The most reasonable hypothesis upon which to base an explanation
of the Washington picketing decisions up to December of 1950 is as
follows:
1. "Stranger" picketing does not arise out of a labor dispute;
"proximate" picketing does.3"
2. The legality of picketing which does not arise out of a labor
dispute depends upon the propriety of its objective. But since objectives are always improper when sought by "stranger" or "non-labor
dispute" picketing, the "true" rule in such cases is the pre-1933 doctrine that all picketing close enough to the employer's premises to be
effective is illegal. Such picketing is unlawful as a matter of means, not
ends."'
2829 Wn.(2d) 810, 189 P.(2d) 473 (1948) (Members of the union were held to be
"employees" even though they were also limited partners).
29 judge Simpson dissenting (joined by Judge Steinert) in Berger v. Sailors' Union
of the Pacific, 29 Wn. (2d) 810, 813, 189 P. (2d) 473, 475 (1948).
30 Although it seems clear that the Washington court uniformly treats "proximate"
picketing as arising out of a labor dispute, there is doubt about when union members
cease to be "employees" of the picketed employer so that their union becomes a
"stranger." The test should be: Did the picketing union have any members employed at
the time that the dispute arose? Otherwise the foresighted employer may insure that the
picketing is "stranger" simply by discharging his unionized workers prior to the start
of the picketing. The Washington court does not appear to have followed this test in
all cases. In Bloedel-Donovan Lumber Mills v. InternationalWoodworkers of America,
Local No. 46, 4 Wn.(2d) 62, 102 P.(2d) 270 (1940), it apparently treated the picketing
union as a "stranger," although members of it were employed at the time the dispute
arose. In Pacific Navigation & Trading, Inc. v. National Organization of Masters,
Mates and Pilots of America, Local 90, 33 Wn. (2d) 675, 207 P. (2d) 221 (1949), which
follows the Bloedel-Donovan case, the court again treated the picketing union as a
"stranger," although some of its members had been employed at the time the dispute
arose. In both cases the court apparently regarded as decisive the fact that the union
had no members employed at the time that the picketing began. In the latter case, however, the court suggested that a picketing union is a "stranger" if it represents none of
the picketed employer's employees. Thus, if the employer is obligated under the NLRA
to bargain with one union, a minority union which pickets is, since it cannot lawfully
represent the employees for purposes of collective bargaining with the employer, a
"stranger" even though some of its members are employed at the time of the dispute.
This test is consistent with the policy reflected by Section 8 (b) (4) (c) of the
Taft-Hartley Act, 61 STAT. 142 (1947), 29 U. S. C. 158 (b) (4) (c) (Supp. 1950).
Further, it can be applied to the organizational picketing cases either in the situation
where neither union has a majority or in the situation where there is only one unionprovided that the court relies on the time that the dispute arose rather than the time
when the picketing began.
81 The Washington court has not squarel held that "stranger" picketing is ipso
facto illegal and enjoinable. But it has uniformly held that such picketing does not arise
out of a labor dispute, and save for the repudiated S & W Fine Foods and O'Neil cases
and the bizarre Lumber & Sawmill Workers case where one group of employees was
picketing another, has consistently enjoined it. Thus the Washington court, by talking
about objectives in the "stranger" picketing cases, has done indirectly what the United
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3. Picketing which does arise out of a labor dispute is lawful,
regardless of its objective. The Blanchard case, insofar as it holds that
all union self-help is to be judged on the basis of its objective, has no
practical importance.
The only decision out of phase with this theory is the Lumber &
Sawmill.Workers case, supra, which not only judged the legality of
"stranger" picketing on the basis of its objective but also held the
objective to be proper. Apparently this case, although based upon the
discarded free speech doctrine, is still good law. At least it has not
been repudiated. However, the case is sui generis. The picketing there
was intended solely to induce employee action and has little relevance
to the typical picketing case which involves an attempt to force
employer action.
Any theory based upon the sweep of sixteen years litigation is vulnerable, particularly when the court has not been consistent in its
approach to the problem. There are, of course, many grounds other
than the absence or presence of a labor dispute for distinguishing
the cases which have permitted picketing from those which have
restrained it. 2 Any careful analyst doubted in December, 1950, that
States Supreme Court said in A. F. of L. v. S

ing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941), that Illinois
could not do directly. If the Swing case has any vitality left (and the matter is not free
from doubt), it stands for the proposition that a state cannot constitutionally strike
down peaceful picketing solely because it is "stranger" in character. It may be that a
narrowly drawn order against signal picketing based entirely on its "stranger" character would stand up against the Swing holding that a state "cannot exclude workingmen from peacefully exercising the right of free communication by drawing the circle
of economic competition between employers and workers so small as to contain only an
employer and those directly employed by him." 312 U.S. 321, 326 (1941). But the matter is doubtful, and the Washington court, either by accident or design, has avoided the
issue by pegging its results in part on the impropriety of objectives.
The United States Supreme Court, in affirming the Gazzam, Hanke, and Cline
cases, supra, did not directly overrule the Swing case nor did it speak in respect to the
constitutionality of state decrees which prohibit picketing of workers by other workers.
See A.B.A. Rep.on State Labor Legislation for 1949-50, p. 5. The heart of its position
is that a state has the power to enjoin picketing which either is intended to force an
employer into violating the policies expressed in a valid legislative enactment or operates against the public interest in the preservation of other values, e.g., the freedom of
little businessmen and property owners from dictation as to business policy by an outside group having but a relatively small and indirect interest in such policy. There is no
longer any reason to think that a state decree enjoining picketing will be struck down
as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment provided that the court is prudent enough
to base the decree on objective and the policy reflected has a rational basis. See A.B.A.
Rcp. on)State Labor Legislationfor 1949-50, pp. 7-8, 10-11.
32 In the Wright case the employer had an "employee" if (as the court held) an oral
lessee of a meat market is really an "employee." In the Hanke and Cline cases the petitioners were businessmen-workers (although Cline had two nonunion employees in
another part of his business at the time the picketing began), and the court made much
of the importance to a democratic society of encouraging small economic units of selfemployed persons. In the Swenson case the majority union had been recognized by the
National Labor Relations Board after a consent cross-check but had not been certified.
In the Weyerhaeuser case the majority union had received no NLRB recognition-
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the court would permit "proximate" picketing in all of the situations
where "stranger" picketing had been restrained. Such doubt is no
longer speculative. The significance of the Ostroff case is that it upset
the long-standing adherence to the "labor dispute" test, enjoined
"proximate" picketing for the first time in fifteen years, and reverted
to the Blanchard doctrine, supra, by holding that, even though there
is a labor dispute, picketing may be enjoined if the court considers one
of its objectives to be improper.
One other preliminary point needs to be made. Testing the legality
of picketing by examining its objective is an orthodox common law
doctrine. But since the common law affords no standards to guide such
judgments, courts have frequently been hard-pressed to justify them.
The process has been criticized as a form of "dog law.""3 The Washington court, in dealing with organizational picketing, has tested the
objectives of such picketing against certain language in Section 2 of
the Labor Disputes Act. The point has been made elsewhere, but it
was spelled out in greatest detail in the Gazzam case, supra, where the
court enjoined "stranger" picketing to force an employer to sign a
union shop agreement. Section 2 of the act states, inter alia, that an
individual worker "should be free to decline to associate with his
fellows" and should be "free from interference, restraint, or coercion
of employers of labor . . . in the designation of . . . [collective bar-

gaining] representatives.""4 Since, the court said in the Gazzam case,
the public policy of the state as set out in Section 2 is to protect from
employer coercion an employee's freedom to decline to associate as
well as his freedom to associate, it is unlawful for a union, by picketing,
although on principle this should make no difference since an employer who refuses to
bargain with a majority union is guilty of an unfair labor practice regardless of whether
the NLRB has acted. In the Safeway case the picketing was primarily for organizational purposes; in the Kimbel case there was a collateral wage demand which the
court described as "reasonable."
33 Gregory, LABOR AND THE LAW, p. 52 et seq. "Scarce any man has the means of
knowing a twentieth part of the laws he is bound by. Both sorts of law are kept most
happily and carefully from the knowledge of the people: statute law by its shape and
bulk; common law by its very essence. It is the judges (as we have seen) that make
the common law. Do you know how they make it? Just as a man makes laws for his
dog. When your dog does anything you want to break him of, you wait till he does it,
and then beat him for it. This is the way you make laws for your dog: and this is the
way the judges make law for you and me. They won't tell a man beforehand what it is
he should not do-they won't so much as allow of his being told: they lie by till he
has done something which they say he should not have done, and then they hang him
for it. What way, then has any man of coming at this dog-law? Only by watching their
proceedings: by observing in what cases they have hanged a man, in what cases they
have sent him to jail, in what cases they have seized his goods, and so forth."-Jeremy
Bentham, Works, Vol. 5, p. 235 (1843).
34 REM. REV. STAT. § 7612-2 [P. P. C. § 695-3].

PICKETING IN WASHINGTON

to undertake to force an employer to sign an agreement which requires
his employees either to join the union or suffer loss of employment.
The point is relevant here because the court, which had refused to
extend the Gazzam doctrine to "proximate" picketing in the Berger
case, supra, applied the doctrine to "proximate" picketing in the
Ostroff case.
OSTROFF V. LAUNDRY AND DYE WORKS D-vns' Loc~AL No. 566
The case arose when the employer, operator of two cleaning and
finishing plants and four stores for cleaning and dyeing in Seattle,
refused to sign an agreement which, inter alia, would have required his
employees, as a condition of continued employment, to join either
Local No. 566 of the Laundry and Dye Works Drivers or Local No.
24 of the International Laundry Workers and Dry Cleaners."
The former union, one of whose members was employed by the
employer at the time of the dispute, responded by establishing a peaceful picket line. The pickets displayed signs stating that "Spic N Span
Dry Cleaners refuses to pay union wages-Laundry and Dye Works
Drivers' Local 566." The picket line was effective. Union drivers
would not cross it to deliver supplies, thus making it necessary for the
employer to drive his own trucks. A substantial number of customers
also respected the picket line, causing Ostroff's gross weekly receipts
to fall from $2,500 to $1,700.
Ostroff countered by calling a meeting to which twenty-three of his
twenty-five employees came. (The union member was on strike, and
one other employee was on vacation.) These employees, in answer to
the employer's request (no showing of coercion), unanimously signed
a statement in which they said that they neither desired to join the
unions nor desired their employer to sign collective agreements with
them.
Ostroff's petition for an injunction was denied by the trial court on
the ground that there was a labor dispute within the meaning of the
Labor Disputes Act, thus depriving the court of jurisdiction to enjoin.
It was this decision which the Washington court overturned by a 5
to 3 vote, holding squarely that "proximate" picketing can be enjoined
even though it arises out of a labor dispute. 86
The majority conceded at the outset of its opinion that, despite the
fact that the union had only one member employed, the picketing
3

5
The Drivers' Local is chartered by the International Brotherhood of Teamsters
and is affiliated with the local of the Laundry Workers. Both are A. F. of L. unions.
86 See note 1, supra.
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arose out of a labor dispute. Section 13 (a) of the Labor Disputes Act,
defining the term, says that it includes a controversy between "one
or more employers and one or more employees."37 But, continued the
court, this does not dispose of the matter. An additional test is: Did
the picketing step over the line from persuasion to coercion? It did,
the argument concluded, because if the union is adamant in its demand
for a closed shop, and the employer ultimately signs, the employees
will have to do something they don't want to do-namely, either join
the unions or find other employment." They will be coerced in the
exercise of their right not to associate, as spelled out in Section 2 of
the Labor Disputes Act; their freedom of choice will be abridged.
This was obviously, despite the talk of "persuasion" and "coercion,"
simply an application of the illegal objective theory evolved in the
Gazzam case. In essence the court said that the means (picketing)
is coercive because the objective (closed shop) forces employees to
choose between two undesired alternatives. Picketing is persuasive
(lawful) or coercive (unlawful) depending upon its objective. If the
objective is unlawful, the picketing is coercive (unlawful). If the
objective is lawful, the picketing is persuasive (lawful).
No matter how you cut this argument it makes objective the test
of legality. It is unfortunate that the court talked so much in terms
of coercion when it was really talking about objective, for the language
tends to confuse the orthodox analysis of picketing. The typical approach is to test the legality of picketing by looking first at what
occurred on the picket line (means) and second at the objective sought
by the union. There are a number of cases enjoining picketing because
of coercive techniques used on the picket line, and it is correct to say
that when pickets obtain refusals to patronize or to work by coercive
rather than persuasive methods, the picketing--or at least its coercive
aspects-will be enjoined." Picketing may be enjoined because of the
§ 7612-13 [P. P. C. § 695-25]. (Italics by the author.)
38 The proposed agreement would have required all drivers, driver helpers, and
37 REm. REv.STAT.

solicitors to join Local No. 566, would have prohibited the acceptance of laundry or dry
cleaning from nonmember drivers and nonunion shops, and would have prohibited the
pickup and delivery of work by nonmembers. The agreement would also have required
that all cleaning, renovating, dyeing, and processing be done by members of Local
No. 24.
31 Perhaps the classic case distinguishing between the coercive and persuasive
aspects of picketing is American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Trades Council, 257 U.S.
184 (1921).
The Washington court, in dealing with picketing that arises out of a labor dispute,
has also prevented intimidation but permitted "missionary" work. For example, in
Weyerhaeuser Timber Co. v. Everett District Council of Lumber & Sawmill Workers,
11 Wn.(2d) 503, 119 P.(2d) 643 (1941), the court permitted the peaceful aspects of
the picketing but limited the number of pickets and enjoined molesting or obstructing.
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means employed or the objective sought, and it is helpful to reserve
the term "coercion" as a test for the legality of the former. The use
of the term in the Ostroff case suggests that the pickets obtained
respect of their line by violence, threats of violence, or threats of
economic reprisal. No such evidence appeared in the record.
A clue to the possible direction in which the Washington court is
traveling was disclosed by the final paragraph of the majority opinion,
which in effect invited the union to drop the closed shop clause from the
requested agreement and petition for dissolution of the injunction.
Such a petition would, the court indicated, be granted. 0 It is apparent,
therefore, that the decision neither protects the employer from the
economic loss caused by picketing nor directly restrains picketing as
such. It is, rather, a restriction of the power of a minority union to
bargain for a dosed shop. The Ostroff case condemns the closed shop
objective, not the picketing. It is not clear how deeply the court's
feeling against the closed shop runs. Perhaps it intends to impose the
Taft-Hartley Act rules and illegalize the execution and enforcement of
such agreements regardless of the circumstances under which they
are reached. Perhaps it intends to adopt the Massachusetts common
law rule which, while it permits a closed shop agreement to exist and
be enforced," proscribes the use of picketing by a union to induce an
employer to enter into such an agreement.," Perhaps it intends to follow
the Massachusetts rule only when the picketing union represents a
minority of the employees. These are questions opened for future
consideration and resolution.
The rule of the Ostroff case can accurately be formulated as follows:
Picketing arises out of a labor dispute when the picketing union has
one member employed by the picketed employer at the time the dispute arises, but the picketing is nonetheless enjoinable if one of its
objectives is to force the employer to sign an agreement which makes
union membership a condition of employment. Since the court had
reached a contrary result in the Berger case, supra, on a similar set
of facts, it was constrained to distinguish the two cases. This was
accomplished by pointing out that here the employees manifested their
desire to remain non-union whereas in the Berger case they did not.43
40 137 Wash. Dec. 559, at 568, 225 P. (2d) 419, at 425.

41
Hariner v. Nashawena Mills, Inc., 315 Mass. 160, 52 N.E. (2d) 22 (1943) and
cases
42 cited.
Fashioncraft, Inc. v. Holpern, 313 Mass. 385, 48 N.E. (2d) 1 (1943).
43
This is a questionable distinction, since in the Berger case 13 of the employees
joined the employer as parties plaintiff. Query: How manifest does a manifestation of
desire not to join the union have to be?
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Thus, to the rule should be added: ".

.

. if the employees have mani-

fested their desire to remain non-union."
The willingness of the court in the Ostroff case to permit the picketing if the "coercive" objective is dropped emphasizes again the decisive
importance of whether or not the picketing is "stranger." In the Gazzam case "stranger" picketing to obtain a union shop was enjoined. In
the Ostroff case "proximate" picketing to obtain a closed shop was
enjoined, but only insofar as it had a "coercive" objective. Apparently
the rule is that one "coercive" objective makes "stranger" picketing
enjoinable, whereas one "coercive" objective makes "proximate" picketing enjoinable only insofar as it is in pursuit of that objective. To
put this another way, it seems that when the Washington court is faced
with "proximate" picketing it restrains the "coercive" objectives but
permits the "persuasive" ones, e.g., advising the public that the employer is not unionized, with the hope that the employees will join,
but when it is faced with "stranger" picketing it restrains all objectives.
This analysis adds support to the thesis that "stranger" picketing is
ipso facto unlawful in Washington as an illegal means to achieve ends,
lawful or unlawful, whereas "proximate" picketing is a lawful means
permissible so long as it is in pursuit of lawful ends; and it focuses
critical attention on the criteria the court uses in organizational picketing cases to determine whether or not the ends sought are lawful.
THE POLICY OF ]FREEDOM OF CHOICE

Since the Safeway case, supra, the court has, by decision, implemented the policy of protecting employee freedom of choice-the same
policy which is spelled out and developed by the National Labor Relations Act as amended in 1947 by the Taft-Hartley Law.44
If unions are what they profess to be, namely, voluntary organizations whereby workers obtain an effective voice in setting the conditions of their economic life, there is no doubt that the freedom of
individual employees to choose which collective bargaining representa4461 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U. S. C. § 141 et seq. (Supp. 1950). Freedom of choice
is the policy of Section 7, 61 STAT. 140 (1947) 29 U. S. C. § 1557 (Supp. 1950), which
guarantees employees the right to form, join, or assist labor organizations and to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing and "the right to refrain
from any or all of such activities," except insofar as such right is abridged by a legally
authorized (by election) union shop agreement. (Italics by the author.) These rights
are protected by Section 8 (a) (1), 61 STAT. 141 (1947), 29 U. S. C. § 158 (a) (1)
(Supp. 1950), against employer interference, restraint, and coercion and by Section 8
(b) (1), 61 STAT. 141 (1947), 29 U. S. C. § 158 (b) (1) (Supp. 1950), against union
restraint or coercion.
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tive, if any, they shall have should be protected by law. Given the
realities of modern economic life and their effect on the individual
bargaining power of workers, the freedom to choose between bargaining representatives (unions) is of more significance, generally at least,
than the freedom to choose between collective bargaining and individual bargaining.45 Nonetheless, there can be no doubt that particular
groups of employees, especially when they are beyond the reach of
the National Labor Relations Act and cannot therefore express their
wishes on the matter at an NLRB-directed election, should-as a
desideratum-not be left powerless to resist the efforts of a strong
organization to capture their membership, if not their loyalty, by
forcing the cooperation of their employer. Indeed, in a society that
stands almost alone in its emphasis on individual freedom, there is
something repugnant about the notion that employees should be
unionized by powerful economic groups without reference to their
individual wishes on the matter, even though it may be "good for
them" or "in the public interest." If unions are the collective voice of
the individual worker in negotiating the rules of his economic life and
implementing what is spoken of as "industrial democracy," it is clear
that the freedom to reject unionization is entitled to some protection
against employer and union (group) pressures. A captive unionist
is not usually a good unionist, and it is not without significance that
the unions that have most frequently "organized" the workers by
"organizing" the employer are those which are characterized by a
powerful, dominant leadership which is relatively free from effective
control by the membership.
But while there is wide agreement to the general proposition that
individual employee freedom of choice should be protected, there is
equally wide disagreement as to what kind of protection against what
kind of pressure it should be given under varying circumstances.
The Washington court, in evolving what may be labeled the GazzamOstroff doctrine, has committed itself to the broad principle that freedom of choice shall be protected against the pressures of picketing to
compel employer assistance in organization, regardless of whether or
not it arises out of a labor dispute, provided that the employees concerned desire to remain unorganized.
45 Despite the equating in Section 7 of the NLRA of the right not to engage in
union activity with the right to engage, the basic policy of the statute is to favor the
establishment of collective bargaining. See Section 1, particularly paragraphs 2 and 3.
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LEGAL BASIS OF THE POLICY IN WASHINGTON

The theory that Section 2 of the Labor Disputes Act sets out as the
law of the state a rule of protecting the individual worker's right to
reject unionization free from employer coercion and union picketing
suggests that the court has no choice but to implement this policy as
particular cases come before it, no matter how complex the problems
presented happen to be. The fact is, however, that the court does have
a choice, for the Labor Disputes Act in nowise compels the court to
the results it reached in the Gazzam and Ostroff cases.
In the first place, the statute does not purport to make any conduct
lawful or unlawful. It withdraws a remedy and makes procedural
adjustments. It does not legalize or illegalize conduct. In essence it
deprives courts of jurisdiction to issue injunctions against certain
conduct engaged in by certain persons and arising out of a labor
dispute. The Norris-LaGuardia Act,46 of which the Washington statute
is an analogue, and an almost verbatim reproduction, is intended to
have, and has had, no effect on federal substantive law at all (except
for the weird decision in United States v. Hutcheson)."' The Labor

Disputes Act is couched in the same language as the federal statute,
and there is no reason to believe that it is intended to lay down state

substantive law.
The point can be emphasized by pointing out the marked distinction
between enjoining picketing intended to compel an employer to do
an act which will subject him to criminal or civil liability, as the
Washington court did in the Swenson case, supra, and as the United
States Supreme Court said Missouri had the power to do in Giboney
v. Empire Storage and Ice Co.,48 and enjoining picketing intended to
compel an employer to do an act which transgresses a policy but does
not subject the transgressor to liability, as the Washington court did
in the Gazzam and Ostroff cases. The court in the Ostroff case cited
the Swenson case as stating the applicable rule. But the Swenson case
is not apposite to the Ostroff case unless the Washington court is now
prepared to say that signing a closed shop agreement subjects an
employer to liability, a result very far removed indeed from the purpose of the Labor Disputes Act.
This is not to suggest that the Washington court has exceeded its
constitutional power under the Fourteenth Amendment. It seems clear
4647

STAT.

70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. § 101 et seq. (1946).

47 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
48 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
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that it has not." The point is made to emphasize that Section 2 of the
Labor Disputes Act does not make substantive law and that the court
has moved far beyond the rule it enunciated four years ago in the
Swenson case.
In the second place, as pointed out supra, the Labor Disputes Act is

essentially a jurisdictional statute designed to restrict, and in some
situations terminate, judicial intervention by injunction in labor disputes. In picketing cases the question of law presented is whether or
not the act is applicable so as to preclude the issuance of an injunction,
not whether or not its language requires the issuance of an injunction.
The basic test for determining whether or not the jurisdictional strictures of the statute come into play in a particular case is the absence
or presence of a labor dispute. In the Gazzam case the court held that
there was no labor dispute, which meant that the restrictions of the
statute did not apply, and proceeded to find the picketing unlawful
by reference to the general language of Section 2. This is anomalous
enough. But in the Ostroff case the court held that there was a labor
dispute, which meant-presumably--that the jurisdictional limitations
of the statute did apply, and then proceeded to enjoin the picketing
anyhow, basing its result on the same anti-injunction act.
The key to this bizarre judicial behavior is found in the Blanchard
case, supra, which invalidated Sections 7, 8, and 9 of the Labor Disputes Act on the theory that legislation abridging the power of the
49

However, the court may run into another constitutional snag if it applies the
Gazzam-Ostroff doctrine to an industry which "affects interstate commerce" and therefore falls within the ambit of the Taft-Hartley Act. Sections 8 (b) (4) (B), 61 STAT.
142 (1947), 29 U. S. C. § 158 (b) (4) (B) (Supp. 1950), and 8 (b) (4) (C), 61
STAT. 142 (1947), 29 U. S. C. § 158 (b) (4) (C) (Supp. 1950), of that statute impose
two restrictions upon strikes, picketing, and other concerted activities aimed at securing
recognition of the union as the bargaining representative. Professor Cox has concluded
that Congress has pre-empted the entire field and that state regulation of such activity
is now improper. This conclusion may also be supported on the theory that the failure
of Congress to deal with primary picketing for recognition indicates, in light of the
debates, that Congress intended, not to leave freedom to regulate such conduct to the
states, but to leave such concerted activity free from any regulation. The argument has
particular force in respect to the Gazzam-Ostroff doctrine since it is so clearly an
implementation of the rights guaranteed to employees by Section 7 of the Taft-Hartley
Act, 61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U. S. C. § 157 (Supp. 1950). Cox and Seidman, Federalism and Labor Relations, 64 HAnv. L. Rv. 211, 237, 225-6 (1950). See Amalgamated
Ass'n, Etc. v. Wisconsin Employ. Rel. Bd., 71 S. Ct. 359 (1951).
However, the Ostroff case appears to be more a regulation of the closed shop than
of picketing, and there is convincing evidence that Congress did not intend to curtail
the power of states to restrict the execution and enforcement of union security agreements. Section 14 (b) of Taft-Hartley, 61 STAT. 151 (1947), 29 U. S. C. § 164 (b)
(Supp. 1950), says that nothing in the law "shall be construed as authorizing the execution or application of arguments requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment in any State or Territory in which such execution or application is prohibited by State or Territorial law."
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courts to issue injunctions violates the state constitution, which invests all judicial power in the courts. Section 4, the heart of the
statute, which specifies the types of union conduct, including picketing,
totally immunized from injunctions when arising out of a labor dispute, is a fortiori invalid on this theory. Section 2 exists primarily
for the purpose of affording a background of language against which
these sections can be construed. Section 13, which defines the term
"labor dispute," is intended to provide a frame of reference for Section
4 and loses its significance without that section. Neither section is
intended, standing alone, to have operative importance. It is clear,
therefore, that when the court relies on Section 13 for the meaning
of the term "labor dispute" and Section 2 for the policy of freedom
of choice, and uses either or both to justify enjoining picketing, it is
engaging in the curious process of lifting the inoperative sections of
an invalid legislative enactment out of context, breeding them with
common law doctrines, and treating the hybrid offspring as a set of
"equitable" rules. This looks like judicial legislation, as patently so
as Justice Frankfurter's tying together of the Clayton, NorrisLaGuardia, and Sherman Acts in the Hutcheson case, supra.
These are harsh words, and their accuracy is weakened by the fact
that the court has decided some of the picketing cases without relying
on the Labor Disputes Act. In 1938 the statute had enough virility
to cause the invalidation of a city ordinance.5" But on other occasions
it has had no appreciable impact on the court's thinking.5 Perhaps,
then, the Labor Disputes Act is not a parent of the doctrine governing
organizational picketing but only a midwife whose testimony as to
the pedigree of the product is quoted when its quality is in doubt.
Indeed, the court has said that the statute is only a guide to "equity
and good conscience."
There is no doubt that the Washington law relating to picketing,
and more particularly the Gazzam-Ostroff doctrine protecting employee freedom of choice, is exclusively a creation of the court.
50 In Yakima v. Gorham, 200 Wash. 564, 94 P.(2d) 180 (1939), the court invalidated a city ordinance which prohibited picketing by a person unless he had been
employed by the picketed employer for at least three months and within the previous
60 days on the ground that it conflicted with the legislative declaration of public policy
in the Labor Disputes Act.
51 In twenty-two picketing cases decided since 1935 the court cited and apparently
relied on the Act fourteen times and either ignored or did not base its decision on the
Act eight times. See Jaffe, Status of Picketing in Washington, 15 WAs3. L. REv. 47

(1940).
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FREEDOM OF CHOICE UNLIMITED?

Freedom of choice is a two-way street. Section 2 of the Labor Disputes Act protects the privilege to associate and to designate collective
bargaining representatives free from the "interference, restraint, and
coercion of employers." Obviously the right to engage in union activity
is accorded fully as much status as the right to refuse to engage. The
problem is to identify the line between private interferences with this
dual-edged privilege which will be tolerated and those which will be
prohibited.
Prior to the Ostroff case the court had pricked out a line based upon
the absence or presence of a labor dispute. The court had laid down
the rule in the Gazzam case that freedom of choice will be protected
from the picketing pressures mobilized by a union which is a
"stranger" to the relationship between the particular employer and
his employees. It had gone the other way in the Berger case, supra,
because the picketing union had members employed by the particular
employer. In broad terms, the rule was that "outside" union interferences with employee freedom of choice will not be tolerated while
"inside" union interferences will be.
However, in the Ostroff case the court conceded that the defendant
union had sufficient interest in the conditions of employment in
Ostroff's business to characterize the picketing as arising out of a
labor dispute, and its decision therefore extended the privilege of
individual employees not to engage in union activity to include protection from "inside" union pressures. This extension raises a multitude of questions.
What additional "inside" union pressures are unlawful abridgments
of employee freedom of choice? Is "proximate" picketing for the union
shop, as well as the closed shop, unlawful? Does a union at some
point acquire sufficient interest in employment conditions in the establishment so that even picketing for a closed shop becomes lawful? Suppose the picketing union has five members employed instead of one, or
51 per cent of the work force instead of 4 per cent. Does the degree of
legal protection accorded the freedom not to engage in union activity
vary directly with the extent of employee hostility or apathy? Suppose
only 45 per cent of the workers manifest a reluctance to join instead
of 92 per cent. Suppose they do not manifest it in writing but only
by joining as parties plaintiff (as in the Berger case, supra).
Is the extension of the Ostroff case limited to freedom from coercive
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"inside" union pressures or does it include freedom from coercive
"inside" employer pressures? On the principle of freedom of choice,
it should embrace both. Is it, then, unlawful for an employer to sign a
closed shop agreement under the circumstances of the Ostroff case?
How about the legality of an employer's refusing to hire a man because
he does not belong to a union, or insisting that he go to the union
hiring hall for clearance and possible referral, or discharging him
because he has been expelled from the union?
The court quotes with approval the statement that the Labor Disputes Act guarantees the right to join or not to join a union free from
coercion of employers; and it says that the statute "does prohibit such
coercion by an employer whether acting voluntarily or through coercive action on the part of other employees. 2 Does this mean that it
is unlawful for an employer to sign and enforce a closed or union shop
agreement voluntarily? Does it mean that it is unlawful for an employer voluntarily to discharge, or threaten to discharge, an employee
for engaging in union activity? Suppose the employer threatens to
fire the employees who do not sign a statement indicating their reluctance to join the union. Does this fact alter the rule of the Ostroff
case or perhaps subject the employer to liability for restraint and
coercion of his employees in the exercise of their right to engage in
union activity?
So long as a court confines itself to enjoining "outside" employer or
union pressures, it can avoid most of these vexatious questions on the
orthodox common law theory that the pressuring employer or the
picketing and "stranger" union lacks sufficient interest in the labor
conditions in the establishment to justify the intentional infliction of
harm on its proprietor. The "labor dispute" test is simply a modern
statutory formulation of this theory. But once a court enjoins the
pressures of an "inside" union which has sufficient interest to concede
that it is involved in a labor dispute, it is in trouble. It has abandoned
the test which fixes the point outside which restraints of freedom of
choice will be enjoined and has shrouded the whole matter with the
cloak of confusion and unpredictability.
The Washington court implied, of course, that the rule of the
Ostroff case applies only when the picketing works against the manifest
desires of the majority of the employees directly involved. There is
no gainsaying the fact that the point has some appeal.
52

137 Wash. Dec. 559, at 568, 225 P.(2d) 419, at 424. (Italics by the author.)
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If the majority of employees in a particular group do not want the
closed shop--or, indeed, any form of unionization-it is certainly
reasonable to say that the law should afford protection against the
efforts of superior economic forces to impose it. This is the principle
of majority rule, which is a precept as firmly fixed in modern labor
policy as it is in American political life. Very likely the court had
this principle in mind when it looked at the Ostroff case in which
twenty-three of the twenty-five employees expressed opposition to
unionization.
Unfortunately, however, the matter is not quite so simple. From
the standpoint of the larger group-that is, the employees of all of
Ostroff's competitors-the Ostroff decision does not represent an implementation of the principle of majority rule. Substandard (nonunion) wages and conditions of employment, insofar as they cause a
total cost differential and permit a price differential, place unionized
employers at a competitive disadvantage vis-h-vis nonunionized employers and pose a continuing threat to union standards everywhere
in the industry. Whenever the vast majority of the employees in the
competitive area of the industry are members of a union-as they
were in the Ostroff case," they are the beneficiaries of union standards
and union bargaining power, have a direct interest in the maintenance
of those standards and that power, and have therefore an interest in
the removal of conditions which threaten them. From the standpoint
of these employees, the decision in the Ostroff case is an affirmation
of the right of a small minority of the employees in the competitive
area of the industry to maintain their opposition to unionization in
defiance of the will of the majority, at the cost of majority bargaining
power, and-perhaps-at the expense of union standards of which all
the employees are the beneficiaries. The decision, from this point of
view, protects the freedom of a few employees to refrain from collective bargaining at the expense of the freedom of the majority to
maintain collective power.
Perhaps the court intended to say in the Ostroff case that, for purposes of the exception engrafted onto the "labor dispute" test, the law
protects, on the principle of majority rule, the freedom of choice of
the employees in the particular "employer," rather than the "competitive," grouping. If this is so, then the court, in addition to creating
for itself the problem in particular cases of determining what the
53
Ninety per cent of the cleaners and dyers in the Seattle area have agreements with
the two unions.
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"uncoerced" wishes of the employees are, has placed itself in an
anomalous position. The "labor dispute" test is intended to determine
whether or not the organized employees in an industry have sufficient
economic interest in the conditions of employment in a particular
establishment in that industry to justify the exertion of economic
pressure against it. When the court ruled in the Ostroff case that the
picketing arose out of a labor dispute it necessarily conceded that the
majority of the employees in the competitive area had an interest in
the employment conditions in Ostroff's business. Thus it recognized
the significance and the relevance of the "competitive" grouping.
Logically, therefore, what the court was saying in the Ostroff case is
that the law protects the right of individual members of the "competitive" unit to be free from picketing pressures intended to force
employer assistance in organization, regardless of the will of the
majority. If this conclusion is correct, the court has laid down a kind
of civil rights rule to protect minority groups in industries characterized by collective bargaining. The rule is, in broad terms, that
individual employees are not to be forced into support of the organization by union security agreements between employers and the group
majority, e.g., closed shop contracts.
How far the court will push this rule-if, indeed, this is the rule
it intends-cannot be foretold. Probably it will distinguish the situation where a union security agreement is being sought as part of
an organizational campaign, the situation where it is being sought
for the first time but as part of bargaining demands in the renegotiation of an old contract, the situation where continuation of an existing
union security contract is being sought, and the situation where the
group is seeking enforcement of an existing union security contract
against a prospective employee who doesn't want to join the union
or an old employee who wants to get out. Perhaps protection of employee freedom of choice will vary according to whether or not the
union has a majority in the plant but a minority in the industry (or
vice-versa), or a majority in both areas (or in neither). Doubtless
the court will draw distinctions between closed shop, union shop,
maintenance of membership, and preferential hiring agreements.
It may well be that the Washington court laid down a completely
sound policy under the particular and peculiar circumstances of the
Ostroff case. But the Ostroff case presented only one narrow aspect of
a much larger problem-viz., the circumstances under which individual
employee freedom to reject or support collective bargaining is to be
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protected against the economic power of the organized group, with or
without the cooperation of employers. The court, by basing its decision
on the ground of freedom of choice, set in motion implications which
run far beyond the facts of the Ostroff case and committed itself to a
broad principle from which it will almost certainly find it necessary
to retreat.
Freedom of choice is a sound enough policy. But the problem of
what kinds of protection against what kindsoof pressures it is to be
given under varying circumstances is complex and vexatious. The
problem has far too many facets to be dealt with adequately or wisely
on a completely ad hoc basis. The Washington court, by pushing the
doctrine, is in effect judicially enacting part of the National Labor
Relations Act into Washington law. 4 It is important to note that the
legislative body which is responsible for that statute has, after thorough examination of the problem, protected freedom of choice in some
instances and subordinated it to conflicting interests in others." If
freedom of choice is our policy, it needs to be spelled out by the legislature after careful and thorough consideration of all of its aspects.
Doubtless, as in the case of all freedoms, there are public limitations
which should be imposed and private abridgments which should be
permitted. This is a dangerous area for a court to work in, even though
the equities of a particular case may make such a policy attractive.
There are two further questions which need to be asked. Section 2
of the Labor Disputes Act protects employee freedom against employer pressures, and the cases in which injunctions have been granted
have been those in which the picketing was intended to force the
employees into supporting the union by forcing the employer into cooperation-by, for example, signing a closed shop agreement. The
Lumber & Sawmill Workers case, supra, in which the court permitted
"stranger" picketing intended to produce employee action directly-that is, without the support of the employer, presumably is still good
law. What will the court do with a picketing case in which the union
is not asking the employer to do anything but is only asking his employees to join? Picketing to force employee action directly is, to the
extent that it is respected by workers and consumers, fully as harmful
to an employer as any other kind of effective picketing. Will such an
54 See note 44, supra.
55
Any lawyer who has had experience with the National Labor Relations Act
knows that while the individual employee's freedom of choice is protected in some
instances, it is sharply curtailed in others. The specific statutory sections and decisions
documenting the point are too numerous to catalogue here.
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employer have a legal or equitable remedy? If not, will he be required
to maintain a position of neutrality-that is, will he be open to legal
action if he succumbs to the pressure which is only indirect as to him
and makes a deal with the union, despite the manifest wishes of his
non-union employees?
Leaving aside the question of the extent to which the court will push
the freedom of choice doctrine, what new objectives will fall within
the ambit of illegality when the court is dealing with "proximate"
picketing? Will such picketing be enjoined insofar as it is intended to
regulate the employer's hours of business, to force him to violate the
National Labor Relations Act, or to force him to pay value for work
which is not to be performed? And what tests will be used to determine
the legality of a particular objective?
These issues can, and will be, resolved if and when they arise. The
court can always come up with a result. The problem is what frame
of reference it can use so that the decisions will represent a reasonably
symmetrical body of doctrine. Certainty is not the end of the law, but
it has its virtues.
THE "LABOR DISPuTE" TEST AND OTHER LIMITATIONS

Much of the court's difficulty with the picketing cases stems from
its definition of the term "labor dispute." The court has been forced
by the early misconstruction of Section 13 of the Labor Disputes Act5 6
to the arbitrary and mechanical rule that a labor dispute exists when
the picketing union has one member employed and does not exist when
the union has no members employed. There is nothing to commend
this rule but its simplicity. There is a large and persuasive body of
authority and literature to the effect that Section 13 of the parent
statute, the Norris-LaGuardia Act, does not compel such a result and,
indeed, precludes it."
Section 13 (c) states: "The term 'labor dispute' includes any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, or concerning
the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employ56 Safeway Stores v. Retail Clerks Union, Local No. 148, 184 Wash. 322, 51 P. (2d)

372 (1935).

57 Lauf v. Shinner, 303 U.S. 323 (1938) ; New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery
Co., 303 U.S. 552, 304 U.S. 542 (1938); cf. Wilson & Co. v. Birl, 105 F.(2d) 948
(C. C. A. 3rd 1939). For a clear and brief, albeit accurate, exposition of the point, see
Gregory, LABOR AND THE LAW, pp. 167-169, 189-191. See also Gregory and Katz, LABOR
LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND COMMENTS, pp. 260-265, 271-274; Jaffe, Status of Picketing in Washington, 15 WASH. L. REV. 47 (1940).
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ment, regardless of whether or not the disputznts stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee."58 Reading this language
against the background of Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering,59 which
held that Section 20 of the Clayton Act" legalizes only self-help
arising out of disputes between an employer and his past, present, or
prospective employees, e.g., "proximate" picketing, it is clear that
Congress intended in passing the Norris-LaGuardia Act to broaden
the permissible area of conflict to embrace self-help (including picketing) by a union organized in the industry in which the employer competes, even though it has no members employed by him, i.e., its picketing is "stranger." The federal courts have so held. 6 The NorrisLaGuardia Act does not, of course, apply to Washington courts. But
the language of that statute and the Labor Disputes Act is identical,
and there is no reason to believe that the Washington legislature intended a different result. Indeed, in light of the rigorous way that
the Washington court had dealt with picketing prior to 1933, there is
considerable reason to believe that it intended the same result. However, as the court pointed out in Adams v. Building Service Employees
International Union"2 and Shively v. Garage Employees Local Union
No. 44,3 the legislature was apprised of the construction put on the
term "labor dispute" in 1935 by the Safeway case, supra, and its
failure to speak at subsequent sessions was a tacit endorsement of that
construction. Nonetheless, the court was not unanimous in its view
of the matter.6 4
r847 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. § 101 (1946). (Italics by the author.)
50 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
6038 STAT. 738 (1914), 29 U. S. C. § 52 (1946).
G"See note 57 supra. For further support of the broad c6 nstruction of "labor dispute," see Section 13 (a) which states that a case grows out of a labor dispute when it
involves persons who have a direct or indirect interest in the same industry, if the dispute involves any conflicting or competing interests in a "labor dispute"-as defined by
Section 13 (c)--of "persons participating or interested" in a labor dispute and relief is
sought against him or it and he or it is engaged in the same industry in which the
dispute occurs and has a direct or indirect interest therein. (Italics by the author.)
There is little doubt that a federal court looking at a Gazzam case or an Ostroff
case would hold that the picketing arose out of a labor dispute.
62 197 Wash. 242, 84 P.(2d) 1021 (1938).
63 6 Wn.(2d) 560, 108 P.(2d) 354 (1940).
64 See Judge Blake, dissenting in Fornili v. Auto Mechanics" Union Local No. 297,
200 Wash. 283, 288, 93 P. (2d) 422, 424 (1939), and in Shively v. Garage Employees'
Local Union No. 44, 6 Wn. (2d) 560, 576, 108 P. (2d) 354, 361 (1940) (Judge Blake
argued for the adoption of the federal construction of the term "labor dispute"). Curiously enough, in Marvel Baking Co. v. Teamsters' Union Local No. 524, 5 Wn. (2d)
346, 105 P.(2d) 46 (1940) the court referred to Section 13 (c) and cited Lauf v. Shinner, 303 U.S. 323 (1938) and New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S.
552, 304 U.S. 542 (1938), both holding that Section 13 (c) embraces "stranger" picketing. However, the decisions were not apposite, since the Marvel case involved "proximate" picketing.
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There is nothing rational about saying that picketing does not arise
out of a labor dispute when the union has no members employed and
does arise out of a labor dispute when it happens to have one. Such
a rule encourages subterfuge, and one can expect employers and unions
to work various kinds of "gimmicks" in an effort to beat the rule. It
is perhaps the irrationality of the criterion for determining when a
labor dispute exists that led the majority of the court in the Ostroff
case to abandon it as the test of legality. But the trouble with abandoning the test is that there is no satisfactory rule suggested to take its
place.
There is much to be said for complete burial of that partially interred
statute, the Labor Disputes Act (including, of course, Section 13),"
and the adoption of the common law rule that the intentional infliction
of harm on another is actionable unless justified. 6 More precisely put,
the rule is: The intentional infliction of harm on another makes a
prima facie tort; the prima facie case is overcome if the defendant
shows that the harm was justified by the advancement of economic
self-interest. There are two tests which can be invoked under this
rule. The first relates to the legitimacy of the union's objective; the
second, to the interest the union has vis-h-vis the employer.
As to the former, the test is: Does the economic pressure exerted
by the organized group have as its objective the strengthening of the
workers' bargaining power, e.g., the closed shop, or the obtaining of
immediate benefits to the workers in their present jobs, e.g., wages,
hours, health benefits, the right of collective bargaining, or adjustment
of other terms and conditions of employment? An affirmative answer
establishes the legitimacy of the objective.
65 As Judge Simpson seems to argue in his dissent (joined by Judge Steinert) in
Berger v. Sailors Union of the Pacific, 29 Wn.(2d) 810, 813, 189 P.(2d) 473, 475

(1948).

66 Bowen v. Matheson, 96 Mass. 499 (1867) (combination of businessmen) ; Mogul
Steamship Co. v. McGregor, Gow, and Co., 23 Q.B.D. 598, S.C. on appeal A.C. 25
(1892) (combination of businessmen) ; McKay v. Retail Automobile Salesmen's Local
Union No. 1067, 16 Cal. (2d) 311, 106 P.(2d) 373 (1940) ; Exchange Bakery & Restaurant Inc. v. Rifkin, 245 N. Y. 260, 15 N. E. 130 (1927) ; RESTATEMENT, ToRTs,
Introductory Notes, § 775, § 779, Introductory Notes, § 784, § 785, comment b, § 788,
comment b, § 794, comment a, §§ 802, 803, 804, comment a, §§ 813, 814, 815, 816; Teller,
LAiBOR DISPUTES AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

§ 84, p. 248.

"... the policy of allowing free competition justifies the intentional inflicting of temporal damage, including the damage of interference with a man's business, by some
means, when the damage is done not for its own sake, but as an instrumentality in
reaching the end of victory in the battle of trade.... I have seen the suggestion made
that the conflict between employers and employed was not competition.... If the policy
on which our law is founded is too narrowly expressed in the term 'free competition,'
we may substitute 'free struggle for life.'" Holmes dissenting in Vegelahn v. Gimter,
167 Mass. 92, 44 N. E. 1077, 1081 (1896).
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As to the latter, the test is: Is the economic pressure exerted against
an employer who is part of the industry in which the pressuring group
is organized so that his continuance as a nonunion employer threatens
group standards everywhere in the competitive area and gives the
organized workers an interest in the terms and conditions of employment in his plant? An affirmative answer establishes that the union is
exerting pressure within the permissible area of economic conflict. This
latter test is the common law formulation of the "labor dispute" test of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act as applied by the federal courts.
The proposed rule obviously permits wide latitude to employer and
union economic combat. It is based fundamentally on the notion that
the conflict between management and labor is a form of competition
'6 7
and that "free competition is worth more to society than it costs.
It is not suggested, however, that either the rule or the policy it reflects
is the optimum. Obviously the doctrine conflicts with some of the
affirmative policies of the labor relations acts. Moreover, it fails utterly
to meet the problem of the economic struggle between an employer
and a union in a strategically located economic activity where tolerance
of economic warfare (competition) costs more than it is worth, e.g.,
a work stoppage in a public utility. It is only suggested that the theory
is consistent with the hands-off or laissez-faire attitudes of the common
law, that it affords a workable frame of reference against which to
resolve cases in a reasonably consistent way, and that it is sound
doctrine in the absence of clearly spelled out and formulated legislative policies to the contrary. One of the basic theses of this comment
is that labor-management conflict is an area for legislative, not judgemade, law.
The suggested doctrine in nowise affects the power of the courts
to enjoin the coercive aspects of picketing. If -the picketing deters
reasonable men from working or patronizing because of fear of physical injury to person or property, the express or implied threats producing that fear can, and should be, enjoined. In cases where the
coercive and persuasive aspects of picketing are so intermingled that
"peaceful" picketing can be only a contradiction in terms, all picketing
should be enjoined.
Further, while secondary picketing (not at the situs of the dispute)
is beyond the scope of this comment, it should be pointed out that the
doctrine serves to resolve such questions. There is not much excuse
6

7 Holmes dissenting in Vegelaim v. Gunter, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N. E. 1077, 1080
(1896).
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for secondary picketing unless the picketed employer either has a unity
of economic interest with the employer with whom the union has its
direct argument, or has joined the latter employer as an economic
ally vis-A-vis the union by, for example, accepting "struck" work.8"
Moreover, the rule applies to all economic weapons commonly employed by unions, including the strike, the secondary strike, and the
consumer boycott.
The Washington court has never used the suggested analysis in
deciding the legality of picketing either by employing the common
law theory or by giving a broad construction to the term "labor dispute," although one Washington judge talked the language of the former thirty-four years ago."9 For the Washington court to take this
step after many years of traveling different paths would be cataclysmic. Yet the alternatives are also unhappy.
The choices available to the court seem clear. It can (with or without
reference to the Labor Disputes Act, preferably the latter), continue
to use a mechanical formula for determining when a labor dispute
exists, enjoin "stranger" picketing as an unlawful means to attain
ends-except when intended to produce employee action directly, and
(following the Ostroff case) separate the "persuasive" and "coercive"
aspects of "proximate" picketing on the basis of what it conceives to
be proper and improper objectives in particular cases, permitting the
former and enjoining the latter. This course of action will run the
court into all sorts of vexatious problems and will necessitate the ad
hoc determination, on a piecemeal basis, of important policy questions--questions for which the common law has few answers. Equity
will be dispensed in its purest form at the expense of certainty and
predictability. The court can treat the Ostroff case as sui generis and
68 For the Washington rule on secondary picketing see United Brewing Co. v. Beck,
200 Wash. 474, 93 P. (2d) 772 (1939). See also Barnard and Graham, Labor and the
Secondary Boycott, 15 WASH. L. REv. 137 (1940).
69 "A tradesman, singly or in combination with others, may lawfully advertise his
goods, undersell, solicit, and win the customers of his rival, knowing that he is thereby
ruining the latter's business. This is competition, and is what the law commends as 'the
life of trade.' In such case one loses his property by the acts of his neighbors, but it is
damnu absque injuria. But the contest must be a fair and honest one. If the same
tradesman, singly or with others, advertises his goods, undersells, solicits, and wins
away the customers of his rival by false representations, intimidation or artifice, not
to better himself, but to injure his rival, he has committed an actionable wrong....
Whatever one man may do, all men may do, and what all may do singly they may do in
concert, if the sole purpose of the combination is to advance the proper interests of the
members, and it is conducted in a lawful manner." Judge Holcomb, quoting from
Karges Furniture Co. v. Amalgamated Woodworkers? Local Union No. 131, 165 Ind.
421, 75 N. E. 877, in his dissenting opinion in St. Germain v. Bakery & Confectionary
Workers' Union No. 9, 97 Wash. 282, 300, 166 Pac. 665, 669 (1917).
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return to the mechanical use of the "labor dispute" test, thus sacrificing rationality for simplicity and consistency. Or it can discard or
redefine the "labor dispute" test and start afresh, thus doing considerable violence to the doctrine of stare decisis.

